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EPA RUNS "CERCLAs" AROUND BANKRUPTCY LAW: IN RE
CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 1 was enacted to protect the public
and the environment from threats posed by hazardous waste disposal.2 CERCLA is designed to remove these threats and place the
burden of cleaning up hazardous waste on the responsible party.3
However, when the responsible party enters bankruptcy, the goals
of CERCLA may be frustrated. For instance, a debtor's liability
under CERCLA may be discharged and the government, not the
responsible party, is left funding the cleanup. 4 In contrast, when
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
2. Enactment of CERCLA followed a wave of highly publicized incidents such
as Love Canal and the "Kepone Disaster." These incidents prompted creation of
the "Superfund" to finance government cleanup of hazardous waste sites. See H.R.
7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1 LegislativeHistory of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund) I
(Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA Legislative History]. For further discussion of the financing of Superfund, see infra note 28 and accompanying text. The
Love Canal disaster involved the condemnation of over 230 homes near Niagara
Falls due to contamination from toxic wastes disposed of in the area. CERCLA
Legislative History, supra, at 1. The released toxins resulted in high rates of birth
defects, cancer, and emotional disturbances. Id. Similarly, the "Kepone Disaster"
involved contamination of the James River in Virginia by the nerve-damaging
chemical Kepone. Id. The contamination resulted in massive health problems and
environmental damage. Id. at 2.
3. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he essential policy underlying CERCLA is to
place the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison.'" Id. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.
1990)). Liability for cleanup does not always fall on the responsible party.
Although CERCLA does not contain an express strict liability provision, strict liability is enforced against parties falling within the statutory liability scheme. See,
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
4. For a discussion of discharge of CERCLA liability, see infra notes 66-103
and accompanying text.
Through the first five years of CERCLA enforcement, the federal government
spent over $119 million remediating hazardous waste sites. ErnRONmENrAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, A SUMMARY OF
FEDERALLY FUNDED REMOVAL ACTIONS 2 (1987). In fiscal year 1993 alone, the government spent approximately $1.6 billion. Keith Schneider, EPA Superfund at 13: A
White Knight Tarnished, N.Y. TIMEs, September 6, 1993, at 7. EPA estimates that it
will cost an additional $15 billion to clean up the country's 1200 priority hazardous
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the liability of a debtor survives bankruptcy and the debtor is faced
with huge cleanup bills, the debtor is denied the "fresh start" envi5
sioned by bankruptcy law.
The current law regulating bankruptcy is embodied in the
Bankruptcy Code, Title 1 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(the "Code"),6 which replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 7 The
Code contains no provisions dealing specifically with issues which
arise under CERCLA. 8 This has resulted in a tug-of-war between
two powerful statutes, both with strong policy mandates pulling in
opposite directions. CERCLA's goal is to impose the cost of
cleanup on a responsible party while the bankruptcy laws aim to
relieve debtors of burdensome liability. The result is a conflicting
patchwork of case law with little consistency or predictability.
Courts are split on almost every issue involving CERCLA claims in
bankruptcy proceedings. 9 Inevitably, in most cases one policy goal
waste sites.

Administration of Superfund Sites by EPA: Hearings of the Oversight Sub-

comm. of the House Ways and Means Comm., July 26, 1993,

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file [hereinafter EPA Hearings].
5. EPA estimates that the average cleanup bill of a hazardous waste site is
approximately $35-40 million. EPA Hearings, supra note 4.
6. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
7. The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, Title I, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
8. See In re Cottonwood Canyon Land Co., 146 B.R. 992, 997 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1992). In In re Cottonwood, a reorganized debtor objected to a proof of claim filed
for $55,000,000 for the cost of environmental cleanup. Id. at 993-94. In holding
that its claim was discharged in the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court rejected the
claimant's position that environmental claims were unique and should be treated
differently under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 997. The claimant had argued that
the debtor "'[sought] to ignore the unique status of environmental claims .... The
fact is that environmental claims are unique because they do not exist at all until
the government determines that certain hazardous waste sites pose a danger to the
environment.'" Id. (quoting claimant's Reply Memorandum). The court noted
that the primary problem with this argument was that "the Bankruptcy Code does
not have a separate category or classification for 'unique claims.'" Id. See also
James K. McBain, Environmental Impediments to Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 68 liN.
LJ. 233, 258-61 (1992) (proposing governmental unit priority in Bankruptcy Code
to address environmental claims). See generally Gary E. Claar, The Casefor a Bankruptcy Code Priorityfor Environmental Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 29
(1992).
9. See generally Thomas G. Gruenert, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Policy
Conflicts, ProceduralPitfalls and ProblematicPreceden4 32 S. TEx. L.J. 399 (1991); Philippe J. Kahn, Bankruptcy Versus EnvironmentalProtection:DischargingFuture CERC.A
Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999 (1993); McBain, supra note 8;
Thomas J. Salerno et al., Environmental Law and Its Impact on Bankruptcy Law - Saga
of "Toxins-R-Us", 25 R
PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 262 (1990); Katherine Simpson
Allen, Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup,38
VAND. L. REV. 1037 (1985); Jill Thompson Losch, Comment, Bankruptcy v. Environmental Obligations: Clash of the Titans, 52 LA. L. REv. 137 (1991); Kevin J. Saville,
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triumphs at the expense of the other. However, when such important policy goals are at stake, this is an unsatisfactory solution.
A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit highlights the inadequacy of this solution. In In re
CMC HeartlandPartners,10 the Seventh Circuit held that CMC Heartland Partners ("CMC"), the reincarnation of the bankrupt Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad, was liable under CERCLA
for cleanup of hazardous waste deposited during the Railroad's
ownership of the land in question."1 The court found CMC liable
notwithstanding EPA's failure to bring an action under CERCLA
until four years after the close of bankruptcy proceedings.12 The
court agreed with CMC that EPA's failure to file a claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings discharged CMC's liability as an operator
or manager of the site. i3 Notwithstanding, the court upheld CMC's
liability as current owner of the site.14 It refused to enforce the
injunction contained in the bankruptcy consummation order barring future claims against the reorganized debtor.' 5 In CMC Heartland Partners, CERCLA goals clearly triumphed over those of
6
bankruptcy law.'
This Note focuses on the conflict arising when a debtor seeks
to have CERCLA claims discharged, and the new dimension added
to the conflict by the Seventh Circuit's decision in CMC Heartland
Partners. This Note begins with a summary of the statutory schemes
and policies behind CERCLA and bankruptcy law. It then discusses
certain conflicts arising from their interaction-how the courts
have balanced the competing policies in the past and how the SevNote, DischargingCERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: Wh&en Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MNN.
L. REv. 327 (1991).
10. 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
11. Id. at 1146. For a detailed discussion of CMC Heartland Partners,see infra
notes 104-53 and accompanying text.
12. CMC HeartlandPartners,966 F.2d at 1147. The record demonstrated that
EPA was aware of the hazard posed by the site at least five years prior to commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
13. Id. at 1146.
14. Id. For a discussion of the CERCIA liability scheme, see infra notes 29-35
and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 1147.
16. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific R.R. that the same bankruptcy consummation order did bar a state environmental agency from bringing a cost recovery action under CERCLA to reimburse the state for its cleanup of a hazardous waste site which the reorganized
debtor did not own. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992). In that case the bankruptcy
laws relieving a debtor of liability trumped CERCLA provisions imposing liability.
For a discussion of Chicago, Milwaukee see infra note 85.
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enth Circuit's recent decision in CMC Heartland Partners furthers
the goals of CERCLA over those of the bankruptcy laws.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Statutory Background
1.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980

In 1979, just prior to enactment of CERCLA, EPA identified
over 2000 hazardous waste sites around the country which posed a
threat to the public health or environment. 17 In response to this
growing threat, Congress pushed through a hastily drafted CERCLA in the twilight of the 96th Congress. 8
The CERCLA statutory scheme is aimed at expediting the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and making responsible parties
pay for the cleanup.1 9 CERCLA requires the President to establish
and maintain a National Contingency Plan ("NCP") 20 which sets
forth criteria for identifying hazardous waste sites and further specifies the procedures EPA must follow in taking action to clean up
the site. 2 ' The NCP includes the establishment of a National Priori17. CERCLA Legilative Histoy, supra note 2, at 147. Recent estimates of existing hazardous waste sites in the United States range from 130,000 to 425,000.
Indushy Compliance with EnvironmentalLaw, Bus. DATELINE, July 19, 1993, at 13.
18. BRADFoRD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE 13 (1991).

The

last-minute legislation has been severely criticized since its enactment. "Caught in
the contradictory winds of environmental anxiety, Reagan conservatism and populist tax revolt, the program was already a political orphan-doomed to founder in
political squabbles, corporate hostility and staggering attorneys' fees. When the
bargaining ended ... the hazardous-waste bill had been watered down beyond
recognition." Frank Viviano, How Superfund Became a Mess; at a 1980 Meeting on
Capitol Hill, It Took A Wrong Turn, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., May 30, 1991, at Al.
19. The goals of CERCLA have been summarized as follows:
1. To establish a comprehensive federal-state mechanism for rapid response to releases or threatened releases into the environment of hazardous substances at facilities that, in many instances, are not owned or
operated by persons financially capable or willing to undertake appropriate response action. 2. To establish a federal trust fund, financed largely
by private industry, to pay the costs of response action by federal or state
agencies and private "volunteers," and to pay the costs of assessing the
injury to and restoring natural resources and of restoring them under the
trusteeship of the federal and state governments. 3. To establish a federal
cause of action for recovery of costs incurred for responses to hazardous
substance releases from four categories of persons: current owners and
operators, owners and operators at the time of disposal, generators of the
substances, and transporters of the substances.
WHrIMAN, supra note 18, at 14.
20. See CERCLA., § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a).
21. The NCP sets priorities for cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Any and all
government response actions, imposition of liability, and Superfund expenditures
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ties List ("NPL") which identifies those hazardous waste sites
throughout the country that pose the greatest risk to the public
health or the environment. 22 These sites are evaluated under the
Hazardous Ranking System ("HRS"). 2 3 If a site scores a certain
level in an HRS evaluation, it is then listed on the NPL.2 4 This listing must reflect the severity of risk of contamination to human
25
health or the environment.
Once a site is placed on the NPL, 26 the government can take
whatever steps are necessary and consistent with the NCP to respond to actual or threatened dangers. 27 The federal government
finances cleanups through the "Superfund" established under CERCLA. 28 If the government draws on Superfund to clean up a site, it
must be consistent with the NCP. CERCIA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). See
County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991); Gen.
Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 344 (D. Md. 1993).
22. CERCLA § 105(a) (8) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (B). The primary goal of
establishing the NPL is to apprise the States and the public of the existence and
location of hazardous waste sites that warrant remedial action. Anne Arundel
County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 412, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As ofJuly 1993, the NPL listed
approximately 1200 sites across the country. EPA Hearings, supra note 4. A property's inclusion on the NPL, by itself, has no legal effect on the owner's liability.
Realistically, however, placement on the list has serious repercussions for the
owner of the property; the specter raised by placement of a site on the NPL virtually always reduces value of such property on the open market. See Kent County v.
EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[EPA] must remain aware that placement on the NPL has serious consequences for a site's owner.") (citing B & B
Tritech, Inc. v. EPA, 957 F.2d 882, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1992); SCA Serv. of Ind. v.
Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355, 1361-65 (N.D. Ind. 1986)).
23. The criteria used in the HRS are set forth at 40 C.F.R. 300 App. A (1992).
These regulations represent a comprehensive system for evaluating the threat
posed by the hazardous substances.
24. Id. There are also several other circumstances which may result in EPA
placing a site on the NPL. For instance, a site which a state designates as its most
threatening to the public health or the environment may be included on the NPL.
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(2). In addition, if the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry advises that the public should be isolated from a release or if EPA
concludes that a release is a significant threat to public health, then that site may
be placed on the NPL. Id. § 300.425(c) (3).
25. CERCLA § 105(a) (8) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (A).
26. Listing on the NPL does not affect liability under CERCLA. CERCLA
§ 105(8) (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8) (b). See Kent County, 963 F.2d at 394 ("[L]isting on
the NPL does not require any action by any party, and does not determine any
party's liability for the cost of cleanup at the site.").
27. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). The statute defines "respond" or
"response" as: "[meaning] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all such
terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement
activities related thereto." Id. § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).
28. When it was originally enacted, CERCLA established the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund to pay for governmental cleanup of hazardous waste
sites. CERCIA § 131, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (repealed 1986). At that time, the fund
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may recover those costs from a potentially responsible party
("PRP") identified under section 107(a).29 Under that section, liability extends to four categories of PRPs: past and present owners
and operators of hazardous waste sites, 30 and transporters3 ' and
generators 32 of hazardous wastes. Because CERCIA is a remedial
statute, the courts interpret these categories of liability broadly to
best effectuate the statute's goals. 33 A PRP is liable for any and all
dedicated $1.6 billion for cleanup during its first five years. WHrrMAN, supra note
18, at 257-62. In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (amending scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
Section 111 of CERCLA appropriates not more than $8.5 billion of the
Superfund for government cleanups for a five year period starting October 17,
1986 and an additional sum of not more than $5.1 billion for the period from
October 1, 1991 through the end of September 1994. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
Section 104(a) dictates when the president can take removal or remedial action financed by Superfund.
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release
or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent
with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal
of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time ... or take any other response
measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the ... environment.
CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
29. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
30. CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). The statutory language in
§ 107(a) is "owner and operator"; however, liability is imposed as if it read "owner
or operator." See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th
Cir. 1992) ("Responsible persons include the current 'owner' or 'operator' of the
facility.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992); Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 604 n.2 (10th Cir.
1992) ("CERCILA identifies the owner or operator of a facility as a party potentially
responsible for environmental response costs associated with the cleanup of the
facility.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992); Hercules Inc. v.
EPA, 938 F.2d 276, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("CERCIA identifies four categories of
responsible parties subject to liability, including current owners or operators of
facilities containing hazardous substances and owners or operators at the time of
disposal.") (emphasis added). Thus, as applied, CERCIA reaches a broader category of PRPs than it might have if CERCLA liability was imposed only on PRPs who
were both owners and operators.
31. CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3).
32. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4). Under this provision, generator liability is imposed when a PRP "(1) disposed of its hazardous substances (2)
at a facility which now contains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of by the
generator (3) if there is a release of that or some other type of hazardous substance (4) which causes the incurrence of response costs." United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
33. See, e.g., Mayland Bank & Trust 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 986) (finding bank that held mortgage to hazardous waste site liable under CERCLA
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response costs incurred in cleaning up the site.34 Additionally, the
PRP is liable for any damages to the environment and the costs35of
any health assessment studies prompted by the contamination.
notwithstanding that wastes were dumped prior to bank's taking possession of
site). See also Nurad, 966 F.2d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that clear language
of CERCLA made prior owner of hazardous waste site liable for "disposal" of hazardous waste when passive migration of hazardous waste occurred during ownership, notwithstanding that prior owner had not actively disposed of any hazardous
substances). But see United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp.
1346, 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (rejecting Nurad court's inclusion of passive migration
in statutory definition of "disposal").
34. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A)-(B). "Response"
actions include both removal and remedial action. Under CERCIA, removal action includes:
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such as may be necessary taken [sic] in the event of the threat of
release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as
may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.
Id. § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23). Removal action is a short-term fix designed to
remove an immediate threat. Remedial action is aimed at permanent cleanup of a
site. Remedial action is defined in CERCLA as:
[t]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment.
Id. § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
35. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C)-(D). Furthermore, although the statute does not specifically provide for it, courts agree that
Congress intended CERCLA to impose joint and several liability on PRPs. O'Neil
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); see
also, United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo.
1987). This approach to CERCIA liability is consistent with the goal of the statute:
privately funded remediation. However, it can result in extreme and sometimes
unjust hardship. As noted in Picil/.
[H]olding defendants jointly and severally liable in such situations may
often result in defendants paying for more than their fair share of harm.
Nevertheless, courts have continued to impose joint and several liability
on a regular basis, reasoning that where all of the contributing causes
cannot be fairly traced, Congress intended for those proven at least partially culpable to bear the cost of uncertainty.
Picillo, 838 F.2d at 138 (citations omitted).
As further noted in PiciUo, the severity of joint and several liability was tempered by provisions added in the SARA amendments. Id. at 179. Section 122(g)
now allows for de minimis settlements by parties who are actually responsible for
only a small amount of the contamination. See CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(g). In addition, the SARA amendments provide that a PRP found jointly
and severally liable can sue another PRP for contribution if the harm is divisible.
See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
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As an alternative to EPA undertaking cleanup action itself and
later seeking to recover those costs, EPA can compel the PRP to
clean up the site. Section 106(a) of CERCLA authorizes the President to issue an order enforceable in federal court directing a PRP
to undertake cleanup measures.3 6 The President may invoke this
authority when it is determined that a site poses an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility... ."37 Alternatively, under section
36. CERCILA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). See, e.g., United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112-14 (D. Minn. 1982) (explaining
conditions under which President, through EPA, may order PRP to clean up site).
After complying with the 106(a) order, the liable party may petition the President
for reimbursement for costs of cleanup when the party can "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for response costs under section
9607(a) ... and that costs for which it seeks reimbursement are reasonable in light
of the action required by the relevant order." CERCLA § 106(b) (2) (C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(b) (2) (C). A party may also recover costs expended "to the extent that [the
party] can demonstrate, on the administrative record, that the President's decision
in selecting the response action ordered was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 106(b) (2) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (D).
If, upon review, the court determines that the government's actions have been
arbitrary and capricious, "the court shall award (A) only the response costs or damages that are not inconsistent with the national contingency plan, and (B) such
other relief as is consistent with the National Contingency Plan." Id. § 113(i), 42
U.S.C. § 96130) (3). Penalties for failure to comply with the order or injunction
may be imposed pursuant to an enforcement action taken by EPA. Id. §
106(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (1). Section 106(a) does not provide an independent basis for liability; therefore, courts have imposed § 106(a) liability pursuant to
§ 107(a). See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 184
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (applying liability as defined by § 107(a) to a § 106(a) action).
37. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). An EPA order issued pursuant to
§ 106 may include any of the following:
1. A statement identifying the "imminent and substantial" danger EPA believes exists and a description of the harm posed in the absence of removal or remedial action; 2. A statement of the authority of the issuing
official... to issue the order; 3. A statement explaining why the recipient
is liable under CERCLA; 4. The actions the recipient of the order must take to
comply with the order; 5. A mandatory timetable for performing and completing those actions; 6. A provision informing the recipient that the duty
to comply with the terms of the order takes effect 72 hours after the receipt of the order; 7. A provision informing the recipient that one of the
subject's representatives may orally contact the agency to request a conference concerning the order and that any such request must be confirmed
in writing; 8. A provision specifying a date by which inquiries regardingthe
order, whether made orally or in writing, must be received; 9. A provision
stating that EPA reserves the right to take action if emergency circumstances so
require and that such an emergency action would in no way relieve the
parties of responsibility for the costs of the action; 10. A provision that
requires (a) adequate chain-of-custody procedures with regard to any required testing and sampling, (b) adequate recordkeepingof activities (so that
records may be used as evidence in any future enforcement case), (c)
cooperation from employees of any contractor who engages in site activ-
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106(a), EPA can ask the Attorney General "to secure such relief as
may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district
court.., shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public
interest and the equities of the case may require."3 8 Under this provision, EPA may seek an injunction directed at abating an "immi9
nent and substantial" threat.3
In order to respond immediately to the danger posed by a release or threat of release, judicial review of remedial measures de40
manded by EPA is precluded until after the threat is removed.
Under section 113(h) of CERCLA, no review of an administrative
order issued pursuant to section 106(a) is available unless the government takes enforcement action.4 1 In addition, no pre-enforceity, and (d) availability of these employees to the Government in preparation and trial of a subsequent enforcement case.
WHITMAN, supra note 18, at 100-01 (citing Lee M. Thomas, EPA Assistant Administrator, EPA Guidance Memorandum to Regional Administrators on the Issue of
Administrative Orders for Immediate Removal Actions 1 (Feb. 21, 1984)) (footnote omitted).
The courts have interpreted "imminent and substantial" to encompass conditions beyond emergency situations. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F.
Supp. 89, 96 (D. Conn. 1988). The harm need not be imminent in order to take
action under § 106(a); the mere threat of imminent harm is sufficient. See United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 192 (finding threat of harm
sufficient to present "imminent and substantial endangerment"); United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1109-10 (comparing CERCLA language
to language of Safe Drinking Water Act requiring that merely risk of harm, not
actual harm, be "imminent").
38. CERCILA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990);
Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987); B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89 (D. Conn. 1988); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp 785
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
An injunction issued pursuant to § 106(a), however, is not the equivalent of a
common law injunction. No showing of irreparable harm is necessary; merely the
risk of harm must be proven. B.F. Goodrich Co., 697 F. Supp. at 97. Nevertheless,
the court must evaluate the situation in light of the other common law requirements of an injunction. Id. "It is appropriate ...to consider such traditional equitable concerns as the availability of an adequate remedy at law; the possibility of
harm to the non-moving party if relief is granted; the likelihood of success on the
merits; and the public interest." Id.
40. See CERCILA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The purpose of this provision is to expedite cleanup measures in the face of an imminent threat and delay
any litigation until after the problem has been resolved and the thread removed.
Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991).
41. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The enforcement actions that
trigger the availability of judicial review under § 113(h) include:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or
damages or for contribution. (2) An action to enforce an order issued
under section 9606(a) of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of
such order. (3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b) (2)
of this title. (4) An action under section 9659 of this title... alleging that
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ment review of EPA prescribed removal or remedial actions
pursuant to section 104 is available; the PRP must wait until completion of the cleanup to have the EPA plan reviewed. 42 By delaying
review of issues of liability or the propriety of the government order, the danger posed by a release or threat of release can be removed immediately and the liability issues decided after the threat
43
to the public welfare or environment has abated.
Under the statutory framework described above, EPA has the
tools necessary to promote congressional intent to remove health
and environmental hazards and to hold those liable for creating a
hazard responsible for its removal. However, as discussed in sections III and IV, when a PRP enters bankruptcy there are several
road blocks to achieving the pure goals of CERCLA.
2.

The Bankruptcy Laws

Bankruptcy law has two underlying policies which have historically directed its application: (1) to provide the debtor with a "fresh
start" and (2) to provide a mechanism and a forum by which credi44
tors can equitably sort out their claims to the debtor's estate.
When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy the debtor may liquidate, usually under Chapter 7 of the Code, or reorganize, usually
under Chapter 11.45 In both cases, after the bankruptcy petition is
the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or
secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site. (5) An
action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States has
moved to compel a remedial action.
Id. See also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilley, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts have consistently held that where judicial review will delay
remedial and removal clean up activities, they are barred from reviewing response
actions prior to an attempt by the EPA to enforce its orders or allegations of liability."); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 411 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (challenging
liability is equivalent to challenging EPA response actions).
42. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 267, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2941.
44. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRuPTcY LAW, 4
(1986); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) ("[The United States Supreme
Court] has certainly acknowledged that a central purpose of the Code is to provide
a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make
peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt.'") (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
45. Liquidation is the most common type of bankruptcy, accomplished under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK,
BANKRUPTCY LAw MANUAL 1-2 (1980). Anyone may file under Chapter 7 who is not
a railroad, insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and
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filed, the Code imposes an automatic stay on pre-petition claims. 4 6
The automatic stay provides fundamental protection for the
debtor. 47 It protects the debtor by barring any claims arising from
judicial, administrative, or certain other statutorily specified action
48
which could have been enforced pre-petition.
The discharge provisions of the Code also protect debtors. In
a Chapter 7 liquidation, the purpose of discharging claims is to reloan association, bank and loan association, homestead association, or credit
union. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1)-(3) (1988). A corporation may file under Chapter 7,
but it will not have its debts discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1). A corporation,
however, may file a bankruptcy plan under Chapter 7 in order to liquidate its assets
and distribute their value amongst its creditors. WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra, at 111.
Unlike liquidation, reorganization under Chapter 11 allows a debtor to continue operating a business.
A basic assumption that underlies American bankruptcy law is that it is
often preferable to encourage and facilitate rehabilitation of businesses
in financial trouble instead of providing for liquidation only. From a
broad perspective, rehabilitation is better for the economy because it
minimizes unemployment and waste of business assets. It is much more
productive to use assets in the industry for which they were designed instead of selling them as distressed merchandise at liquidation sales. Alsd,
rehabilitating a business is in the best long-term interest of creditors and
shareholders.
Id.
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, a reorganization plan is developed which is
designed to pay creditors out of the estate, but also to maintain profit-generating
assets in order to allow the debtor to continue as an ongoing business. A reorganizing debtor is required to meet with its creditors. The court must appoint a
committee of creditors to represent all unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a)(1). This committee has certain rights and duties. Id. § 1103. Among
these rights is the right to participate in formation of a reorganization plan. Id.
§ 1103(c)(3). A plan may only be confirmed if, inter alia, "[c]onfirmation of the
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial
reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." Id. § 1129(a)(11).
The intention underlying this requirement is to ensure that only plans which are
feasible are confirmed. WEINTRAUB & REsNxCK, supra note 45, at 8-108. Furthermore, any payment to be fixed after confirmation of the plan must be approved by
the presiding bankruptcy court as reasonable. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (4). If the payments to be made are not reasonable, the plan cannot be confirmed.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 362. The Code defines a "claim" as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right
to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced tojudgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101 (4). Under both the former Bankruptcy Act and the current Code,
the courts have interpreted "claim" broadly to effectuate the purpose of bankruptcy and maximize relief to the debtor.
47. MARTIN J. BIENENSTOC BANRutirrcv Reorganization 7 (1987).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8) (1988).
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lieve the individual debtor from any personal liability. 49 Although

not available to corporations under Chapter 7, discharge of claims
is available to corporations in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding.5 0 Once a reorganization plan is submitted and confirmed, certain claims arising prior to confirmation are discharged.5 ' The
debtor remains fully liable, however, for all claims arising after
Chapter 7 liquidation or confirmation of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.
The Code also provides for abandonment of property under
certain circumstances. During bankruptcy, a trustee may abandon
any property that is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value" to
the estate. 52 Under the abandonment provision, the trustee may

abandon property to any party with a possessory interest in that
property. 53 Property which is abandoned is no longer part of the
bankruptcy estate; instead, ownership reverts back to the debtor as
if there had been no bankruptcy petition filed.5 4 There are limits,

however, to when a debtor can abandon property. In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the
Supreme Court held that a trustee may not abandon property in

violation of a state law "reasonably designed to protect the public
health and safety from identified hazards."55
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. Section 727(a) lists several exceptions to the dischargeability of claims in a Chapter 7 liquidation. In addition, § 523 of the Code
lists exceptions applicable to discharge under both Chapters 7 and 11.
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
51. Id. § 1141(d). In light of the "fresh start" policy of bankruptcy law, courts
have leaned towards a liberal construction of discharge provisions under both the
current Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See, e.g., In re Pioch, 235
F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956); In re Langer, 12 B.R. 957, 960 (D.N.D. 1981) (citing
In reJones, 490 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1974)). Under Chapter 11, plan confirmation will not discharge the debtor's obligations if:
(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the
property of the estate; (B) the debtor does not engage in business after
consummation of the plan; and (C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this title if the case were a case under
Chapter 7 of [the Code].
11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d) (3) (A)-(C).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a).
53. Id.
54. In re McGowen, 95 B.R. 104, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
55. 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986). The issue in Midlantic was whether, under
§ 554(a), a trustee could abandon property which did not comply with state laws or
regulations intended to protect the public health or safety. Id. at 496. In that case,
the debtor, Quanta Resources Corp. ("Quanta"), processed waste oil at two sites in
New York and NewJersey, under a permit issued by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection ("NJDEP"). Id. at 497. When NJDEP discovered that
Quanta had violated a condition in the permit, NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease
processing. Id. Subsequently, NJDEP and Quanta began to negotiate funding a
cleanup of the New Jersey site. Id. Before settlement was reached, however,
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In addition to giving the debtor a fresh start, bankruptcy law is
also aimed at protecting creditors' rights to an equitable distribution of the estate. 56 Adequate notice of the bankruptcy must be
given to all creditors and equity security holders having a claim
against the debtor's estate.5 7 Distribution of the assets of a debtor's
estate will depend on the type of claim asserted by the creditor.
Under the Code, there are five categories of claims. In order of

Quanta filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Id. Immediately thereafter, NJDEP
issued an administrative order to Quanta requiring Quanta to take action to clean
up the site. Id. Within a month of that order, Quanta converted its Chapter 11
reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id.
At the time of the bankruptcy, the mortgage on the New York site exceeded
the value of the property, and the trustee notified all parties of his intent to abandon the property. Id. The trustee alleged that the property was a burden to the
debtor's estate. Id. In response, the city and state of New York objected to abandonment of the site because it posed a threat to the public health and safety. Id. at
498. They based their argument in part on § 959(b) of the Code which requires a
trustee in bankruptcy to maintain property in compliance with applicable state
laws. Id. The Bankruptcy Court, affirmed by the District Court for the District of
New Jersey, allowed the abandonment and both actions were appealed to the
Third Circuit, which reversed. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision, holding that a
"trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards." Id. at 507. Although the Code codified the judicially developed doctrine
of abandonment without specifying that a trustee could not abandon property in
violation of state and federal laws, the Court found that in enacting § 559, Congress intended the provision to include that common law limitation. Id. at 501.
The Court looked to Congress's repeated affirmation of its "'goal of protecting
the environment against toxic pollution'" to support its conclusion. Id. at 505
(quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116, 143 (1985)).
56. A creditor is defined in the Code as "an entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.. .

."

11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (A).

57. 11 U.S.C. § 342(a).. This notice provision is intended to give creditors a
chance to protect their claims from discharge under the bankruptcy. See Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co. v. Bullock (In re Robintech, Inc.), 863 F.2d 393, 396 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("A creditor's claim can be barred for untimeliness only upon a showing
that [creditor] received reasonable notice."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1988). Failure to give notice may result in a dischargeable claim surviving bankruptcy. See,
e.g., California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In reJensen), 995 F.2d 925, 930
(9th Cir. 1993) ("'[N]othing in the legislative history or the Code suggests that
Congress intended to discharge a creditor's rights before the creditor knew or
should have known that its rights existed.'") (quoting Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does a Claim Arise, 76 MINN. L. REv.
327, 349 (1991)). See also Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R.
648, 653 (D. Minn. 1991) (stating insufficient notice of claim against PRP bars
discharge of claim); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 837
(D. Minn. 1990) (holding debtor's failure to disclose potential CERCLA liability
barred discharge).
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priority, they are: secured claims, 58 administrative expenses,5 9 priority claims, unsecured claims, and equity interests. 6° In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 proceedings, the distribution of a debtor's
61
assets must be determined according to these priorities.
Although the Code defines "claim" and sets forth the treatment of claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, the determination of
exactly when a "claim" arises is often dependent on the underlying
substantive law. However, when a CERCLA claim arises is not clear
from a reading of the statute itself. This uncertainty has resulted in
a conflict between the policy goals of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code. This conflict is explored below.
B.

The Conflict

Since its enactment, myriad questions and conflicts have arisen
as to how CERCLA should be implemented - who is liable and
under what circumstances. One major area of conflict occurs "at
the increasingly crowded 'intersection' between the discordant legislative approaches embodied in CERCLA and the Bankruptcy
Code." 6 2 CERCLA and the Code are complex and comprehensive
statutes each with a strong legislative mandate. In order to effect
the "fresh start" policy, Congress designed the bankruptcy laws to
release a debtor from past liabilities and expedite the disposition of
any claims against the debtor. 63 In contrast, CERCLA seeks to hold
all responsible parties liable and specifically provides for delayed
resolution of liability issues until after any hazard has been elimi58. A secured claim is secured to the extent of the value of the collateral. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a).
59. Administrative expenses include "the actual, necessary costs of preserving
the estate . . . ." Id. § 503(b). Administrative expenses receive priority over all
claims except secured claims. Id. § 507(a) (1).
60. See generally, In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 131 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1991) (outlining priority of claims under Bankruptcy Code).
61. Id. at 565.
62. Juniper v. Development Group (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d
915, 921 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
63. See, e.g., Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Ass'n),
838 F.2d 35,37 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Code often accelerates litigation
by allowing a bankruptcy judge to estimate contingent liabilities. .. ."); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. and Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[B]ankruptcy's goal of giving debtors a fresh start would be frustrated if creditors
who failed to file timely claims tried to bring claims against a reorganized company
after the close of bankruptcy."). By expediting the disposition of claims against a
debtor, a bankruptcy court can more equitably distribute the assets of the debtor.
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nated. 64 Unfortunately, the policies underlying these statutes conflict.65 By ignoring this conflict, Congress has effectively charged
the courts with reconciling these competing policies.
Much of the litigation involving a reorganizing debtor's CERCIA liability arises in the context of determining when a CERCLA
or other environmental "claim" is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 66
Debtors seek to establish that a CERCLA claim arose pre-petition
and is therefore discharged in bankruptcy. In contrast, the government frequently argues that no CERCLA claim existed pre-petition
and therefore the claim was not discharged. To date, courts have
not established a consistent standard; discharge or survival of a
claim depends on the particular court's characterization of the
claim.
A recent and controversial decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit attempted to establish a standard for making
this determination. In In re Chateaugay,6 7 the Second Circuit upheld a district court's ruling that EPA's claims for response costs
were discharged regardless of when those costs were incurred, as
long as the release or threatened release was pre-petition. 68 In
Chateaugay, EPA became aware of contaminated sites owned by the
debtor when the debtor informed EPA during its reorganization
that it anticipated that all CERCLA claims arising from pre-petition
conduct, including contingent claims, would be discharged in the
bankruptcy proceedings. 69 The federal and New York state governments then sought a declaratory judgment affirming that response
costs that EPA incurred post-confirmation were not dischargeable
64. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). For a discussion of the CERCIA provision staying judicial review of claims in favor of cleaning up hazardous
waste, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
65. Hemingway Transp., 993 F.2d at 921.
66. See Kevin J. Saville, Note, DischargingCERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When
Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 327, 337-53 (1991) (summarizing different
approaches used by courts to determine when CERCLA claim arises).
67. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 999.
69. Id. at 1000. On July 16, 1986, the debtor, LTV Corporation, filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Id. at 999. On its schedule of liabilities, LTV listed
24 pages of "contingent" claims held by EPA and environmental regulators in
every state and the District of Columbia. Id. These contingent claims included
environmental liability stemming from LTV's pre-petition conduct for which EPA
had not yet incurred any response costs. The schedule failed to provide any further details. Id. In response, EPA filed a $32 million proof of claim which identified LTV as a PRP at 14 hazardous waste sites. Id. This $32 million did not
represent all of EPA's claims; EPA was still not certain of all possible sites for which
LTV might be a PRP. Id.
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The court found that

the statutory relationship between EPA as a creditor and LTV as the
reorganizing debtor contemplated contingent claims and these
claims therefore dischargeable. 71 Furthermore, the court found
that even though EPA did not yet know the location of all potential
hazardous waste sites for which the debtor could be liable, these
were contingent claims and were thus subject to discharge. 7 2 The
court rejected EPA's argument that the Code should be more narrowly construed as applied to CERCLA claims in order to promote
environmental protection. 73 The court stated that if the Code creates barriers to environmental cleanup, then it is for Congress to
change the Code; it is not for the courts to reinterpret the Code to
4
promote other statutory goals.'
70. Id. at 1000.
71. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. The court specifically limited its holding to
pre-petition releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances and avoided
laying down a blanket rule that all claims arising from any pre-petition conduct
were discharged. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1002. As noted by the court, EPA's argument is flawed and could, in
other circumstances, be used against EPA. EPA argued that in the LTV reorganization, response costs not yet incurred should not be viewed as claims and, therefore,
should not be discharged. Id. at 1005. However, if this argument is employed in a
Chapter 7 case, then EPA would not have a claim until it incurred response costs,
and would have no chance at any recovery against a liquidating debtor's assets. Id.
at 1005. Furthermore, this approach might prohibit a debtor from reorganizing.
Indeed while EPA obviously prefers in this case to keep its CERCLA claim
outside of bankruptcy so that it may present it, without reduction, against
the reorganized company that it anticipates will emerge from bankruptcy,
one may well speculate whether, if unincurred CERCLA response costs
are not claims, some corporations facing substantial environmental
claims will be able to reorganize at all.
Id.
74. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002. The court also addressed the issue of
whether EPA's claims were administrative priorities. Determination of administrative expense priority classification for environmental obligations presents another
much-litigated conflict between CERCLA and the bankruptcy laws. The primary
issue is "[w ] hether the obligation is deemed pre-petition and thus paid pursuant to
classification as a general unsecured claim, or whether it is considered post-petition and thus entitled to administrative expense priority. ... " Losch, supra note 9,
at 161. In Chateaugay, the lower court determined that for sites which LTV currently owned and from which there had been a pre-petition release or threatened
release, and for which EPA had assessed post-petition cleanup costs, those costs
qualified as administrative priorities under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Id. at 1009.
At trial, the debtor and its unsecured creditors argued that this was "an unwarranted attempt to convert pre-petition contingent claims into priority claims by the
simple expedient of liquidating them, i.e., incurring response costs and securing
reimbursement." Id. EPA countered by arguing that satisfaction of these claims
was necessary to preserve the estate because cleanup allowed the estate to comply
with environmental laws. Id. The district court granted EPA's claims for administrative priority, relying on Midlantic, in which the Supreme Court held that a
debtor could not abandon property in contravention of a state environmental law
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The bankruptcy court in In re National Gypsum Co. qualified
the Chateaugay approach. 75 The National Gypsum court agreed with
Chateaugay to the extent that determining when a "claim" exists is a
question of when the pre-petition conduct results in the release of
hazardous substances, without consideration of when response
costs were incurred. 76 However, the National Gypsum court then
departed from the broad Chateaugay approach. The court pointed
which protected the public health and environment. Id. (citing Midlantic,474 U.S.
494, 507 (1986)). For a discussion of Midlantic, see supra note 55. The district
court reasoned that if a debtor could not abandon property which was in violation
of environmental law and which posed a threat to the public health, then the costs
for removing that threat were necessary costs of preserving the estate. Id. at 1010.
The Second Circuit agreed:
[The debtor's] argument that EPA should not be able to obtain administrative priority for a contingent claim by liquidating it overlooks the fact
that EPA is doing more than fixing the amount of its claim; it is acting,
during administration of the estate, to remedy the ongoing effects of a
release of hazardous substances.
Id. See also In reWall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that response costs incurred by state in evaluating hazardous waste site
qualified as administrative expense because compliance with state environmental
laws and protection of the public was necessary to preserve estate); In re Peerless
Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948-49 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that EPA's
claim for response costs incurred against Chapter 7 debtor was administrative expense because trustee could not have avoided liability by abandoning property in
violation of CERCLA and rejecting trustee's argument that EPA's claim should not
be administrative expense because that would deplete estate as this is normal
course of liquidation). The view taken by the Chateaugay court is the majority
view. Losch, supra note 9, at 163. The minority view holds that cleanup obligations
are not a necessary cost of preserving the estate. Id. (citing In re Dant & Russell,
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137
(3d Cir. 1985)). For an in-depth discussion of this conflict, see Gruenert, supra
note 9, at 431-39.
75. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992). The debtor,
National Gypsum and its parent corporation, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11 in October 1990. Id. at 399. EPA filed a proof of claim asserting debtor liability
under CERCLA for response costs already incurred, future response costs, and
natural resource damages. Id. at 401-02. The proof of claim identified seven sites
listed on the NPL and reserved EPA's right to charge the debtor as a PRP on at
least 13 unlisted sites. Id. at 400.
EPA contended that neither future response costs for listed sites, nor debtor's
liability at unlisted sites, were claims dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at 401. Instead, EPA argued that under bankruptcy law, the court should look to the underlying substantive law, CERCLA, to determine when a claim arises. Id. at 403.
According to EPA, a claim did not arise under CERCIA "until costs have been
expended or remedial measures adopted to address environmental hazards." Id. at
404.
76. Id. at 407. The National Gypsum court agreed with Chateaugay that reconciliation between the Code and CERCLA allowed for an estimation of contingent
environmental liabilities as "claims" within the meaning of the Code, thus subjecting them to the possibility of discharge. Id. at 406. This estimation allows the court
to make the determination of what status to give to potential CERCLA liabilities.
Id. However, actual liquidation of the claim would await "normal CERCLA enforcement proceedings." Id. (citing Chateaugay,944 F.2d at 1006).
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out that although the Second Circuit purported to apply a contractual standard to determine when a CERCLA claim arises, the actual
standard applied is far more broad. 77 The bankruptcy court said
that this standard reached claims which could not have been "fairly
contemplated."7T Instead, the court in National Gypsum held that
claims based on pre-petition conduct were dischargeable only if
those claims could be "fairly contemplated." 79 This "fairly contemplated" standard may preserve CERCLA claims which could be discharged under the broad Chateaugay approach. 0
The bankruptcy court in United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal8 1 took an even more narrow approach than that in National
Gypsum. In Union Scrap, the bankruptcy court stated that a CERCLA
claim arises only when there is pre-petition release or threat of re82
lease of hazardous substances and cleanup costs are incurred.
That court distinguished Chateaugayon the grounds that in Chateaugay, EPA was aware of potential claims during the bankruptcy proceedings, and, therefore, had the opportunity to pursue its claims,
but failed to do so. 83 Conversely, in Union Scrap, EPA was not aware
of the debtor's ownership of the site in question until four years
after the closing of bankruptcy proceedings. EPA therefore could
not have incurred any response costs representing a CERCLA claim
at the time of the bankruptcy.8 4 The court refused to force EPA to
pursue a potential claim every time a potentially responsible party
initiated bankruptcy proceedings.8 5
77. Id. at 406-07.
78. Id.
79. National Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 406-07. The court suggested the following
factors be considered in determining when a potential claim is fairly contemplated: "Knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable, NPL
listing, notification by EPA of PRP liability, commencement of investigation and
cleanup activities, and incurrence of response costs." Id. at 408.
80. EPA argued that this approach would discourage EPA from filing a claim.
Id. If contingent claims would be discharged when no response costs had been
incurred, it would benefit EPA to sit on a claim through bankruptcy "'waiting instead to pursue the recovery of costs only after they have been incurred in the
ordinary course of its activities .... '" Id. at 408 (quoting United States Motion for
Legal Determination of Issues Raised in the Debtor's Objections, Motions and/or
Counterclaims at 36). The court rejected this argument noting that, while CERCIA itself puts no time limits on EPA response, under bankruptcy law, EPA must
file a claim merely upon discovery of a site. Id. at 409.
81. 123 B.IR 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
82. Id. at 835.
83. Id. at 836.
84. Id. at 834.
85. Union Scrap Iron & Meta4 123 B.R. at 837. ("Adopting [this] position
would effectively require pre-enforcement CERCLA litigation by forcing the EPA
to investigate and assess its potential CERCLA claims every time a conceivable pohttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss1/8
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In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit clarified the deficiencies in the Chateaugayapproach and instead followed more closely
the approach used in National Gypsum. In In reJensen,8 6 a corporation owned by appellees, the Jensons, had filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11.117 Two months later, the California Water
tentially responsible party filed for bankruptcy. This would reverse the CERCLA
scheme and threaten the effectiveness of EPA action."). Ironically, a similar approach was taken by the Second Circuit in Carter Day Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re
Combustion Equip. Ass'n), 838 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988). In Combustion Equip.,
the Second Circuit refused to grant a debtor's motion for declaratory judgement
that any CERCLA claim arising from contamination at a site owned by debtor's
bankrupt subsidiary was discharged. Id. at 40-41. In that case, the only action
taken by EPA was sending a letter informing the debtor of potential liability. Id. at
36. The court concluded that the issue was not ripe because EPA had taken no
further action and a contrary holding would require EPA to spend its assets "preserving its claim" instead of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Id. at 39-40.
In In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., the Seventh Circuit addressed
an issue similar to that involved in Union Scrap. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
Chicago, Milwaukee concerned CMC Heartland Partners, the same reorganized
debtor who is the subject of In re CMC Heartland Partners. In Chicago, Milwaukee,
the court held that the injunction contained in bankruptcy consummation order
barred the Washington State Department of Transportation ("WSDOT") from
bringing an action against CMC under CERCLA arising from a spill of hazardous
substances which occurred when one of the Railroad's trains derailed in 1979. Chicago, Milwaukee, 974 F.2d at 778.
The Chicago, Milwaukee Railroad had filed for bankruptcy in 1977 under the
now repealed Bankruptcy Act. As the bankruptcy proceeding progressed, the
bankruptcy court set a bar date of December 26, 1985. Id. at 780. In 1984,
WSDOT purchased the site and subsequently incurred cleanup costs. Id. at 778.
The record showed that the Washington State Department of Ecology ("WSDOE")
knew of the contamination by mid-July 1985; by November 26, 1985, tests confirmed that the site contained hazardous waste. Id. The district court, affirmed by
the Seventh Circuit, found that WSDOT had a claim prior to the bar date and
rejected WSDOT's argument that the debtor failed to give sufficient notice. Id. at
778-79. Having failed to file a claim by the bar date, WSDOT's claim was discharged. Id. at 779.
Relying on Union Scrap, WSDOT had argued that it did not have a claim dischargeable under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (relating specifically to railroads) until it incurred response costs. Id. at 779. The Seventh Circuit disagreed.
It found that because Section 77 contemplated contingent claims which had to be
brought in order to preserve a claim, it was not necessary that actual response costs
have been incurred before a claim accrued under Section 77. The court refused to
lay down a rule requiring that actual response costs must be incurred before a
claim exists under CERCLA. Instead, the court held:
When a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a
known release of a hazardous substance which this potential claimant
knows will lead to CERCLA response costs, and when this potential claimant has, in fact, conducted tests with regard to this contamination problem, then this potential claimant has, at least, a contingent claim for
purposes of Section 77.
Id. at 786.
86. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In reJensen), 995 F.2d 925
(9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Jensen].
. 87. Id. at 926.
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Board notified the Jensens that it had discovered tanks containing
hazardous substances on the corporation's property. The Water
Board requested they take immediate action to remove the threat
posed by the hazardous substances. 8 8 The Jensens' attorney notified the Water Board that if forced to clean up, the corporation
would liquidate under Chapter 7, instead of reorganizing under
Chapter 11.89 Ultimately, the Jensons did convert the bankruptcy
to a liquidation with the Jensens also filing for personal bankruptcy
under Chapter 7.90 Two years after the closing of their bankruptcy,
and after failed attempts to get the Jensens to clean the site, the
California Department of Health Services ("DHS") undertook
cleanup itself.9 1 In a subsequent action by DHS to recover costs,
the bankruptcy court held that DHS's claim had arisen post-peti92
tion and was not discharged.
A bankruptcy panel of the Ninth Circuit overruled that decision, holding that the claim was discharged because it arose preThe Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected
petition.93
Chateaugay's broad approach and instead adopted the "fairly contemplated" standard of National Gypsum.9 4 The court imputed the
Water Board's knowledge to DHS and concluded "that the state
had sufficient knowledge of the Jensens' potential liability to give
rise to a contingent claim for cleanup costs before the Jensens filed
their personal bankruptcy petition ... -95 Based on this, the court
96
ruled that DHS's claim was discharged.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Jensen, 995 F.2d at 926.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 926 (citingJensen v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. (In reJensen) 114

B.R. 700, 707 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990)).
93. Jensen v. California Dep't of Health Servs. (In reJensen), 127 B.R. 27, 33
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991)).

94. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930-31.
95. Id. at 931.
96. The history of this case is a paradigm of the varying approaches taken to
resolve the issue of when a CERLCA claim arises for purposes of bankruptcy. Initially, the issue was addressed by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
California in Jensen v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A. (In reJensen), 114 B.R. 700
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990). In that case, the bankruptcy court held that the State's
claim arose after cleanup costs were incurred and was not subject to discharge,
notwithstanding that liability arose out of pre-petition conduct. The court stated
that in determining when the claim arose, the only material fact was when cleanup
costs had been incurred. Id. at 702. That court rejected decisions based on an
analogy to mass tort law that a claim arises immediately upon the negligent conduct. Id. at 704. Instead, the court said that all the elements of a CERCLA or state
environmental claim were not present until recoverable costs had been expended.
Id.
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A similar conflict arises in the context of when an injunction
issued pursuant to environmental regulations constitutes a dischargeable claim. In the landmark decision of Ohio v. Kovacs,9 7 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue. In Kovacs, the Court held that
when compliance with an injunction obligates the debtor to a
money payment, the injunction amounts to a claim and is discharged. 98 However, what the Court did not hold is equally as important. In dicta, the Court stated that its decision did not question
that a debtor or its successor-in-interest must comply with state environmental laws. 99 The effect of this decision is that an injunction
On appeal, a bankruptcy panel of the Ninth Circuit in Jensen v. California
Dep't of Health Servs. (In reJensen), 127 B.R 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), reversed.
In its opinion, the bankruptcy panel reviewed three different approaches taken by
the courts to determine when a CERCLA claim arises: the claim arises with the
right to payment; the claim arises upon the establishment of the debtor-creditor
relationship; and the claim arises based upon the debtor's conduct. Id. at 30-33.
The appellate panel adopted the third approach, which was specifically rejected by
the district court. The appellate panel stated that an analogy to mass tort cases
"most closely reflects legislative intent and finds the most support in the case law."
Id. at 32. As discussed supra notes 86-95, a full panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

97. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
98. Id. at 283. In Kovacs, defendant operator of a chemical waste business had
been enjoined by a state court to cease dumping hazardous waste in Ohio waters.
Id. at 276. The defendant failed to comply with the injunction. Id. Consequently,
the state appointed a receiver to take charge of the defendant's assets and use
them towards cleaning up the hazardous waste site. Id. The defendant then filed
for bankruptcy, pursuant to which the State requested a declaration that any obligations under the injunction would not be discharged because they were not
claims. Id. at 276-77. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision
upholding the district court ruling that the State's action against the defendant
was a claim and that "Ohio essentially sought from Kovacs only a monetary payment and that such a required payment was a liability on a claim that was dischargeable under the bankruptcy statute." Id. at 277.
99. Id. at 285. The Supreme Court relied on this dicta in its decision in
Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NewJersey Dep't Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
For a discussion of Midlantic, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Although Midlanticwas decided in the context of enforcement of a state environmental regulation, courts have widely applied the rule in bankruptcy cases involving CERCLA claims. See, e.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re
Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 15-17 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Peerless Plating Co.,
70 B.R. 943, 946-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76
B.R. 523, 532-33 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268,
271-74 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). Midlantic, however, limits the prohibition on
abandonment to situations where violation of regulations pose a definite danger to
public safety. In contrast, EPA can take enforcement action under CERCLA in
cases where there is merely a threatto the public welfare or environment. Notwithstanding the "definite" standard in Midlantic, some of the lower courts have extended the Midlantic ruling to reach PRPs under CERCLA. In those cases, the
mere threat of release would prevent the debtor from abandoning the property.
In Peerless Plating,the bankruptcy court held that a trustee could not abandon
property which was not in full compliance with CERCLA. Peerless Plating,70 B.R. at
947-48. In that case, the bankruptcy court noted that although EPA had presented
only minimal evidence of an imminent threat it found the circumstances in the
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that directs the owner of a site to comply with environmental regulations might not be a dischargeable claim.1°°
In Chateaugay, the Second Circuit applied the Kovacs distinction between a "claim injunction" from a "non-claim injunction" to
CERCLA liability. The court stated that a cleanup order issued
pursuant to CERCLA is dischargeable to the extent that it allows a
money payment to be made in place of undertaking cleanup obligations.1 0 ' Under this standard, if EPA orders a debtor to clean up a
site that does not pose a threat of release of hazardous wastes, that
order may be discharged if EPA could have taken cleanup action
itself and later sued for reimbursement. On the other hand, if the
order directs the debtor to cease polluting, the debtor cannot offer
a money payment to continue polluting, therefore, the order does
not constitute a "claim" and is not dischargeable.10 2 Although the
court applied this standard, it acknowledged that "the line . . .
could arguably be drawn somewhat differently, for example, by
placing on the non-'claim' side only those injunctions ordering a
defendant to stop current activities that add to pollution.., while
leaving on the 'claim' side all other injunctions...

."1 03

case warranted its decision in light of Congress's intent in enacting CERCLA. Id. at
947.
A more narrow reading of Midlanticwas applied by the Fourth Circuit in SmithDouglass. In that case, the court upheld a district court ruling allowing a trustee to
abandon property because the court found no imminent threat to the public even
though the property was in violation of state environmental laws. Smith-Douglass,
856 F.2d at 16-17. See also Purco, Inc., 76 B.RL at 533-34; Franklin Signal Corp., 65
B.R. at 271-72.
100. See In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d 997 (1992).
101. Id. at 1006-09. The court examined the analysis put forward by Professors Baird and Jackson in response to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in In re Kovacs,
717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), affd, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). Professors Baird and
Jackson asserted that dischargeability should hinge on a distinction between the
following two types of obligations:
[t]hose obligations of a debtor that result from activities engaged in
before the filing of the petition and whose consequences continue to exist
even if the debtor goes out of business or dies the moment that the bankruptcy petition is filed, and those obligations that arise because of the
debtor's continued existence and that would disappear if the debtor were
to cease operations or die.
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. Rxv. 1199, 1204 (1984). The Chateaugay court simplified this distinction
and described it as one "between an injunction 'to cease polluting' (non-dischargeable) and an injunction 'to clean up toxic wastes that already have been
deposited' (dischargeable)." Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1007. However, noting that

most environmental injunctions involve enjoining a party from continuing to pollute as well as cleaning up existing pollution, the court rejected that distinction. Id.
at 1007-08.
102. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1008.
103. Id. at 1009.
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As Chateaugaydemonstrates, resolution of these issues is difficult. If EPA takes cleanup action itself to ameliorate ongoing pollution, a claim against a debtor for reimbursement may be discharged
during bankruptcy, and the debtor free from that liability forever.
However, if instead EPA orders the debtor to take action, the
debtor may still be liable regardless of any bankruptcy proceedings
past or present. This was the situation in In re CMC Heartland
Partners.
III.

A.

1R
IN

CMC HEARTLAND PART

RS

Factual and Procedural Background

CMC Heartland Partners is the reincarnation of the reorganized Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad (the "Railroad").104 In 1977, the Railroad filed a voluntary petition for
bankruptcy under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the
"Act").105 The petition was assigned to a Reorganization Court
10 6
which established bar dates pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
On November 12, 1985, that court entered a Final Consummation
Order, 10 7 which barred all actions against CMC, as the reorganized
company, from obligations incurred by the Railroad. 0 8
104. Brief for Appellant at 4, In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143
(7th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-3005) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
105. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 5; 11 U.S.C. § 205 (repealed 1978).
106. The court setJanuary 9, 1980 as the bar date for all pre-petition claims.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 7. As the bankruptcy proceedings progressed,
all parties to the reorganization negotiated a proposed reorganization plan. Id. at
6. On July 12, 1985, the Reorganization Court approved the proposed plan and
issued a Confirmation Order. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 7. The Final Consummation Order established a final date of November 25, 1985 at which time title of assets under the bankruptcy trustee's administration reverted back to the reorganized successor and no further claims could be
asserted. Id. at 7-8.
108. The injunction provided:
All persons, firms, corporations and other entities, including without limitation the United States... are by this Order perpetually restrained and
enjoined from instituting, prosecuting, or pursuing, or attempting to institute, prosecute, or pursue, any suit, action or proceeding ("Action")
against the Reorganized Company (or its successors and assigns), or
against any of the assets or property of the Reorganized Company (or of
its successors and assigns) directly or indirectly, by reason of or on account of any obligation or obligations incurred by the Debtor or by the
Trustee, except the obligations imposed upon or required to be assumed
by the Reorganized Company by the Plan (including those claims filed
pursuant to Section 11.1 of the Plan which are ultimately determined to
be Allowable Claims) or this Order.
Id. at 8-9.
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As successor to the Railroad, CMC retained ownership in a
property known as Wheeler Pit.1°9 In 1956, the Railroad had leased
a portion of Wheeler Pit to General Motors ("GM"). 110 GM used
the pit to dispose of hazardous wastes from its nearby manufacturing plant from 1960-1964."11 In 1974, GM filled in the pit and to112
day there are trees growing over the site.
EPA was aware of the waste disposal at Wheeler Pit at least as
early as 1972.11 3 In 1981, both GM and CMC informed EPA of the
waste dumped at the site.'1 4 In response, EPA performed hazardous waste testing on the site and in 1984 placed Wheeler Pit on the
NPL.115
In September 1990, after completing an evaluation of the site,
EPA conducted further testing and selected a final remedy for
cleanup at the site.116 On May 6, 1991, EPA issued an administrative order to CMC and GM pursuant to section 106(a) of CERCLA, 1 17 directing those parties to implement the remediation plan
EPA had selected by May 13, 1991.118 In response to this order,
109. In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1992).
110. Id. General Motors was also liable under CERCILA for cleanup of the
Wheeler Pit site. However, the court does not address the issue of General Motors'
liability except to note that General Motors had an obligation for cleanup. Id. The
government's administrative order, which is the subject of the appeal in CMC
Heartland Partners, was also directed to General Motors. Appellant's Brief, supra
note 104, at 12.
111. CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d at 1145. General Motors "dumped
paiht spray sludge, residue from its part hanger striping system, clarifier sludge
and powerhouse coal ashes from its automobile assembly plant. . . ." In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 130 B. 521, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
112. CMC HeartlandPartners,966 F.2d at 1143.
113. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 10. This was two years prior to GM's
cessation of dumping, five years prior to commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, and approximately 19 years prior to EPA's CERCLA § 106(a) order. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 11. EPA conducted an HRS evaluation of the site. Id. The site
scored high enough under the HRS to warrant listing on the NPL. For a full discussion of the HRS and the NPL, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
The HRS evaluation caused EPA to incur response costs as early as 1983. Chicago,
Milwaukee, 130 B.R., at 522. Subsequently, EPA, CMC, and GM entered into an
Administrative Order and Consent. Pursuant to that Order, CMC and GM performed a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study which EPA oversaw. Id.
CMC and GM reimbursed EPA for its oversight costs. Id.
116. Id. EPA's selected remedy required "the consolidation of waste and soil
from adjacent property onto the original disposal area, the construction of a compacted clay cover on the site and the monitoring and evaluation of groundwater to
ensure the effectiveness of the remedial action." Id.
117. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). For further discussion of
§ 106(a), see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
118. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 12. EPA asserted that "releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances at the Wheeler Pit site could present
an imminent substantial endangerment to public health and the environment."
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CMC went back to the Reorganization Court asserting that the injunction contained in the Final Consummation Order discharged
CMC's liability as current owner of the Wheeler Pit site.' 1 9
The Reorganization Court rejected CMC's assertion, holding
that the injunction did not bar EPA's section 106(a) order and
120
CMC was therefore liable for the cleanup as the current owner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the Reorganization Court's decision. 12' It held that although the
waste was deposited during ownership by the Railroad, the injunction did not preclude EPA from issuing a section 106(a) order to
the current owner, CMC. 1 22 The court found CMC liable based on

EPA's determination that the site currently posed an actual or
123
threatened imminent danger to the public and the environment.
B.

The Seventh Circuit's Analysis

The Seventh Circuit conceded that to the extent that sections
106 and 107 required monetary payment today for acts occurring
before or during the bankruptcy,' 24 under the former Bankruptcy
Act, EPA had a "claim" under CERLCA. 125 The court reasoned
that any "claim" against CMC as prior operator or manager was
therefore discharged in the bankruptcy. 26 However, the court distinguished this "claim," from an action brought under section
106(a) in conjunction with section 107(a) liability against a current
owner. 27 In that case, there was no discharge and CMC was liable
Chicago, Milwaukee, 130 B.R. at 522-23. Under the language of § 106(a), the Presi-

dent is authorized to order cleanup when he determines that a site poses this type
of threat. Judicial review of this determination is delayed until after cleanup is
completed. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). See supra notes 40-42 and

accompanying text.
119. Chicago, Milwaukee, 130 B.R. at 523. See supra note 108 for the text of the
injunction.
120. Id. at 524. Without explanation, the court rejected CMC's attempt to
analogize this case to several others relating to this bankruptcy in which the district
court and the Seventh Circuit enforced the injunction and barred claims against
CMC. Id. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. RR, 878 F.2d 182 (7th
Cir. 1989) (enforcing injunction contained in Consummation Order to bar former
employee from bringing claim after applicable bar date); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 112 B.R. 920 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (enforcing injunction to bar
claim not filed by applicable bar date). The court merely stated that these cases
did not bear on the outcome of CMC's motion. Id.
121. In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1992).

122. Id. at 1146.
123. Id. at 1147-48.
124. Id. at 1146.
125. CMC HeartlandPartners, 966 F.2d at 1147.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 1146.
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for the cleanup. 128 The court's analysis severs any connection between CMC as the reorganized debtor and CMC as the current
owner of the Wheeler Pit site. The court analogized the survival of
the CERCLA claim to a situation in which CMC, after reorganization, had sold the property to a third party.' 29 That third party,
having no protection from bankruptcy law, would be liable under
CERCLA as the current owner. 3 0° In the same way, CMC, as the
current owner, had no protection from any prior bankruptcy proceedings when there existed an imminent threat to the public or
the environment.' 3 1

The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in
Kovacs,' 32 in which the Court stated in dicta that anyone in possession of a site must comply with the environmental laws of the
state.' 3 3 In CMC Heartland Partners, EPA had determined that

Wheeler Pit posed a threat of the kind contemplated by section
106(a), and under Kovacs, CMC, as current owner, must comply
Court's
of the Reorganization
CERCLA, regardless
with
34
injunction.1
The final issue addressed in the decision was CMC's liability in
the case of an arbitrary or mistaken action by EPA in directing CMC
to clean up. The court acknowledged EPA's obligation to prove
that Wheeler Pit posed an imminent threat as contemplated by section 106(a), in order to sustain CMC's liability.' 3 5 If EPA's findings
were incorrect, CMC will be compensated for any costs expended in
However, pursuant to section 113(h), that
remediating the site.
128. Id.
129. CMC HeartlandPartners, 966 F.2d at 1146-47.
130. Id. The court cited Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 288 (1992). In that case, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part a district court ruling that CERCLA liability depended on proof of
active participation in disposal of hazardous waste. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840. The
court held that § 107(a) imposed liability on a present owner of a site on which
there was a release of hazardous substances, even though the present owner was
not responsible for the disposal. Id. In addition, the court upheld the liability of
past owners of the facility even though they had not been actively involved in the
disposal which led to the release. Id. at 846.
131. CMC Heartland Partners,966 F.2d at 1147.
132. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
1,33. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285. For a discussion of Kovacs, see supra notes 97-100
and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 1146. The court analogized the survival of the CERCLA statutory
obligation to security interests and other liens which survive bankruptcy. Id. at
1147. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (holding that under
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, lien on real property survived bankruptcy).
135. CMC HeartlandPartners,966 F.2d at 1147.
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issue must wait until after cleanup or until EPA takes enforcement
36
action.'
C.

Critical Analysis: Emergence of a New Conflict

Bankruptcy courts are courts in equity and can provide relief
where a court at law cannot.' 3 7 However, courts in equity are still
bound by the limits of federal statutes. 3 8 In CMC Heartland Partners, the statutory confines of CERCLA limited the court's ability to
provide an equitable solution. The decision poses a new question,
unresolved by the statutes themselves, that arises when a PRP enters
or is in bankruptcy: if EPA is subject to a statute of limitations on
when it can recover from a PRP, should EPA similarly be subject to
limitations on when it can force a PRP debtor to take cleanup action? Currently, there is no such limitation on EPA. Therefore, in
the absence of any legislative mandate, the Seventh Circuit in CMC
HeartlandPartnersheld CMC, the current owner, liable for cleanup
of Wheeler Pit, regardless of the fact that EPA knew that the hazardous waste at the site posed a threat to the public and the environment nineteen years prior to taking any action to remove that
39
threat.'
EPA's action against CMC for cleanup was brought pursuant, to
section 106(a) of CERCLA which authorizes EPA to issue an order
136. CERCIA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). For a discussion of§ 113(h) see
supra notes 40-42.
137. United States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th
Cir. 1990).
The court may issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this tide. No provision of this
tide providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action in
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
138. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
('[Wihatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."); Childress v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. Partnership), 934 F.2d 723, 725 (6th
Cir. 1991) ("The equitable powers of section 105(a) may only be used in furtherance of the goals of the [Bankruptcy] Code.").
Some courts facing issues of CERCLA liability in a bankruptcy action have
refused to interpret the Code beyond its plain meaning. "[T] he comprehensive
nature of the bankruptcy statute does not relieve us of the obligation to construe
its terms, nor may we resolve all issues of statutory construction in favor of the
'fresh start' objective, regardless of the terms Congress has chosen to express its
will." United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay), 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.
1991).
139. For a full discussion of the facts of CMC Heartland Partners,see supra
notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
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140
directing a responsible party to clean up a hazardous waste site.
Currently, CERCLA does not restrict EPA's time period for removing a threat posed by a release or threat of a release of a hazardous
substance. 41
Thus, there was no obligation on EPA to have
brought an action against CMC under CERCLA any time prior to
when it actually did. As current owner of Wheeler Pit at the time of
142
the action, CMC was liable under section 107(a).
The CMC HeartlandPartners decision is a logical extension of
43
the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's ruling in Kovacs.'
The Court in Kovacs discharged an injunction against the defendant finding it to be a claim dischargeable within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code. 44 However, in dicta, the Court specifically
stated that it was not holding that a party may ignore state environmental regulations simply because of the party's bankruptcy proceedings. 145 This was the situation in CMC HeartlandPartners.That
CMC was borne of a bankruptcy reorganization was irrelevant; CERCLA is an environmental regulation, and EPA is authorized to determine when a site is in violation of CERCLA and take appropriate

-140. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). For a full discussion of § 106(a),
see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
141. "There exists no statute of limitations under the terms of CERCIA itself
by which EPA must respond to a release or else lose its right to seek relief against
PRPs." In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 408. CERCILA does, however, impose a statute of limitations for claims against the Superfund for the recovery of
costs and for recovery for damages. See CERCIA § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9612(d) (1). There is also a statute of limitations governing when a civil action
can be brought for recovery of costs and recovery of damages. See CERCIA
§ l13(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g). These provisions were added under the SARA
amendments of 1986. Congress imposed these limitations in part to "provide a
finality to affected responsible parties." H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2861.
142. Under this approach, the court seemingly avoids any conflict between
the policies of CERCLA and those of bankruptcy law. The court simply viewed the
liability under CERCLA as a statutory obligation which, according to Kovacs, required compliance by the current owner. In fact, as noted at the end of the decision, CMC admitted at oral argument that if Wheeler Pit was in fact releasing
hazardous waste, it had an obligation to pay. CMC HeartlandPartners,966 F.2d at
1148. Consequently, the court characterized CMC's action as merely an attempt to
avoid the § 113(h) bar to pre-enforcementjudicial review. Id. CMC had contested
its liability by arguing that, in addition to EPA's claim being barred by the bankruptcy proceedings, the contamination found by EPA was not created by the waste
at Wheeler Pit, and thus CMC was not obligated to clean up the site. Id.
143. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
144. Id. at 280. For a discussion of Kovacs, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
145. "Plainly [the party in possession] may not maintain a nuisance, pollute
the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." Id.
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action.1 46 In light of Kovacs, in this case the determination of
whether EPA action constitutes a "claim" was irrelevant. 147 Furthermore, the Supreme Court also made it clear in Midlantic that
when faced with a threat to public health and environment, the
bankruptcy policies aimed at a "fresh start" for the debtor are
148
overridden.
CMC HeartlandPartnershighlights the problems presented by
attempting to resolve the conflict between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code. In its decision, the court acknowledged that "the public gains less from relief in 1992 than from a cleansing in 1974 or
1985, for noxious substances have escaped in the interim." 149 Not
only does this result contravene the goals of CERCLA, but it also
violates a fundamental principle of bankruptcy law identified by the
court:
[B]ygones should not prevent the best current deployment
of assets. Sunk costs and their associated promises to creditors create problems of allocation when the firm cannot
146. For a discussion of the CERCLA statutory scheme, see supra notes 17-43
and accompanying text.
147. The Seventh Circuit summarily acknowledged that EPA would have had
a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy without any further analysis. CMC Heartland
Partners,966 F.2d at 1146. However, it is clear that under the standard adopted by
the Seventh Circuit immediately following this case, EPA would have had a "claim,"
had the court engaged in a more thorough analysis. In In re Chicago, St. Paul,
Milwaukee & Pacific Railroad, also decided under the provisions of the former
Bankruptcy Act, the Seventh Circuit held that when a potential CERCLA claimant
could link a debtor with contamination, and the potential claimant had conducted
tests regarding the contamination, then the potential claimant had at least a contingent claim. Chicago, Milwaukee, 974 F.2d 775, 786 (7th Cir. 1992). For a discussion of Chicago, Milwaukee, see supra note 85. Under that standard, there is no
dispute that EPA had at least a contingent claim prior to the Railroad's filing for
bankruptcy. EPA had been aware of the hazardous waste dumped at Wheeler Pit
five years prior to the Railroad's filing. Appellant's Brief, supra note 104, at 10.
Furthermore, EPA put the site on the NPL almost two years prior to the postpetition bar date. Id. at 11. There is also no dispute that EPA knew of the bankruptcy proceedings.
148. The bankruptcy court in In rePeerless Plating Co. suggested a result similar to that in CMC HeartlandPartners. In PeerlessPlatingCo., EPA brought an action
against the trustee to recover costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site.
70 B.R. 943, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). EPA argued that those claims should
be considered an administrative expense. Id. The trustee argued that the claim
should not have been considered an administrative expense because the trustee
could have abandoned the property. Id. at 946. Turning to Midlantic, the court
determined that the site in question presented a threat to the public health and
thus could not be abandoned. Id. at 947-48. The trustee further argued that even
if that were so, EPA's claim was barred because it arose pre-petition. Id. at 948.
Without deciding whether this was a claim or not, the court held that such a determination was irrelevant because the estate was the current owner of the site and
was liable. Id.
149. CMC HeartlandPartners,966 F.2d at 1147.
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pay its debts as they come due. But assets that cannot generate enough revenue to pay all claims may still produce
net profits from current operations. So bankruptcy
cleaves the firm in two. Existing claims must be satisfied
exclusively from existing assets, while the "new" firm, created as of the date the petition is filed, carries on to the
150
extent current revenues allow.
Although the hazard posed by the Wheeler Pit site still exists, the
disposal of the wastes creating the hazard on the site is a "bygone,"
occurring long before commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding.151
Had EPA brought an action under section 106(a) to enjoin
CMC as the current owner of the property to take remedial action,
assets existing at the time of the bankruptcy would have been
deployed to satisfy EPA's claim prior to the bankruptcy. The same
would have happened had EPA brought the action prior to the
debtor's filing for bankruptcy. The difference is that assets of the
debtor, prior to its reorganization, could have been used to satisfy
and discharge the claim then, instead of EPA's bringing the action
four years later against the reorganized debtor. This result would
have furthered the goals of CERCIA by removing the threat
sooner. It would also have provided a fresh start for CMC by relieving CMC of future liablity for cleanup of the Wheeler Pit site.
Subsequent to placing Wheeler Pit on the NPL in 1984, and
one year prior to the bankruptcy bar date, EPA had grounds for
bringing a section 106(a) action. Placement on the NPL indicates
that EPA believes a site may pose or does pose an imminent threat
to the public health or environment. 152 Therefore, EPA apparently
had sufficient grounds for bringing a section 106(a) action before
the bankruptcy closed, but did not do so. The court ignores this
issue and the result in this case underscores the fact that EPA has
no obligation under CERCLA to take action even when inaction
may result in injury to the public health or environment. 153 As this
150. Id. at 1146 (citing Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d
562 (7th Cir. 1986)).
151. Clearly the threat is ongoing and not a bygone. As the court itself stated,
any liability CMC has as an operator or manager was discharged. Id.
152. For a discussion of the criteria for placement on the National Priorities
List, see supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. This is the same standard
which must be established before EPA can take action under § 106(a). See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
153. Peerless PlatingCo. addressed an analogous issue. The court granted administrative priority to EPA claims. The trustee argued that EPA's claims should
be equitably subordinated because of EPA's "bad faith." PeerlessPlatingCo., 70 B.R.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss1/8

30

Barth: EPA Runs CERCLAs around Bankruptcy Law: In Re CMC Heartland Partn
1994]

IN RE

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS

233

decision demonstrates, EPA can bring a section 106(a) action at
any time regardless of the defendant's past or present identity as a
debtor. As a result of this decision, EPA can run "CERCLAs"
around bankruptcy law.
IV.

IMPACT

The decision of the Seventh Circuit in CMC HeartlandPartners
encourages EPA to plan remediation around PRPs' bankruptcy filings. This contradicts CERCLA's policies of forcing immediate
cleanup of hazardous waste.15 4 During the time EPA is aware of a
threat, but fails to take any cleanup action, there may be an actual
release. That release, by EPA's own determination, endangers the
health and safety of the public and the environment. 155 This result
clearly subverts Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA.
This result is also contrary to the goals of bankruptcy law. In
light of this decision, EPA may sit on a claim it knows to exist during a PRP's bankruptcy proceedings, and wait until the debtor has
reorganized to bring an action under section 106(a). Although this
result fulfills CERC[A's mandate to make the responsible party pay,
it undermines the bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy and harms
the debtor in several ways. First, it leaves the debtor without the
normal protections of the Code. For instance, under the facts of
CMC HeartlandPartnersand following the holding of Midlantic, the
trustee could not abandon the site because it was not in compliance
with environmental regulations. Furthermore, in reality, there was
little chance that the trustee could have sold the land, given EPA's
listing of the site on the NPL in 1984. Finally, if the potential liability for a CERCLA claim survives bankruptcy, a reorganized debtor
may have difficulty obtaining credit, customers, or capital necessary
to continue its business. Average cleanup costs for a hazardous
56
waste site are currently estimated to be 35 to 40 million dollars.'
Liability of this magnitude chills any inclination a debtor may have
at 948. EPA had "barged in" to the bankruptcy proceedings and delayed its administrative expense request until after cleanup concluded. Id. The court refused
the trustee's request finding that EPA's actions came "not from malice but from a
lack of bankruptcy expertise." Id. This leaves open the issue of whether any malice, or failure to act in a timely manner, would affect at least this court's decisions
concerning CERCLA claims in bankruptcy.
154. For a full discussion of the CERCIA provision barring judicial review
prior to enforcement of CERCLA, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

155. The court in CMC HeartlandPartnersacknowledged that cleanup taken
years after the site becomes a threat does not benefit the public as much as earlier
action would have. CMC Heartland Partners,966 F.2d at 1147.
156. EPA Hearings, supra note 4.
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of restarting a business, thus encouraging debtors to liquidate instead of reorganizing.

57

CMC HeartlandPartnersdemonstrates the need for Congress to
address the issues arising from the conflict between CERCLA and
bankruptcy law. As EPA becomes more effective in addressing hazardous waste problems, more suits will be brought against PRPs, including those in bankruptcy. Some consensus is needed to provide
consistency in the courts and predictablity for the PRPs. That consensus should be part of any changes made when Congress
reauthorizes CERCLA in September 1994.
The Clinton Administration is currently re-evaluating the entire statute, proposing liability and enforcement changes with the
goal of enabling EPA to administer CERCLA as cheaply and effectively as possible. 158 Part of achieving that goal involves making enforcement of the requirements more fair, reducing the cost of
enforcement, and increasing the effectiveness of cleanups. 159
Consistent with these goals, and with providing an equitable
solution to the CMC Heartland Partners problem, would be an
amendment to CERCLA which imposes an obligation on EPA to
take action to clean up any site listed on the NPL within a certain
period after listing. Listing on the NPL currently imposes no such
obligation on EPA, nor does it have any legal effect on the liability
of the responsible party. Yet placement on the NPL indicates that
EPA believes the site may pose a threat to the public health or environment. 60 Thus, as it currently exists, CERCLA contradict its own
policies. CERCLA demands that EPA identify hazardous waste sites
in order to ultimately remove a threat to the public. Yet, CERCLA
does not demand that EPA take action within a certain timeframe
to abate a threat as soon as possible.
157. The Chateaugay court noted:
A determination that the CERCLA response costs ultimately to be incurred are not now claims might impair the prospects of achieving a viable reorganization, with the result that the debtor, instead of
reorganizing, liquidates under Chapter 7 or dissolves under state law, and
the assets of the corporation are either unavailable for environmental
cleanup costs because such costs are not "claims" entitled to pro rata payment, or available only to the limited extent that such costs are considered unaccrued claims for which reserves must be established under state
law.
Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
158. EPA Hearings, supra note 4.

159. Id.
160. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. This is the same standard
EPA uses to determine if it will take action under CERCLA.
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An amendment which mandates that EPA take action within a
certain period after NPL listing, or under other certain circumstances, will further the goals of both CERCLA and the bankruptcy
laws. First, cleanup will commence sooner, thus eliminating the
threat sooner. Second, the debtor will be aware of liability which
may then be taken into account during the bankruptcy. Thus, this
suggested amendment would provide for speedier cleanup-the
goal of CERCLA. It would also provide for more predictability and
better protection for debtors-the goal of the bankruptcy laws.
CatherineA. Barth
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